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Introduction 
Through a sketch of the technology developmental history for Japan, it is discussed
how the unique state-society relations and organizational strategies in Japan affected
the formation of formal and informal institutions concerning the development of the IT
hardware industry in which the state and societal actors interact with each other. It
will be argued that the state has played an inconsistent role not because of the strong
and autonomous state that was envisioned by the early statist literature, but because of
the institutional strategies and state-society-business relations that are unique to the
political economy of the accelerated industrial catch up strategy for IT in Japan.  In
contrast to Japan, some countries like Taiwan literally built the whole IT sector in the
beginning but then relinquished most control to entrepreneurs as soon as possible.
States like Taiwan also built an enhanced version of a highly diverse free market
“rules of the game”system which unlike Japan and South Korea, did not grant
exclusive privileges and monopolies to certain large firms but rather built a transparent
and level playing field embracing both small and large enterprises and accountability. 
Another point is the problem of bureau pluralism in Japan as opposed to open
pluralism which promotes full competition and accountability for all institutions based
on results not connections. Some countries avoided bureau pluralism by embracing an
openly pluralistic institutional strategy that involved the privatization of government
research institutions and the spinning off of almost all state run programs into the
private sector in order to create the fullest possible diversity of human resources,
competition and transparent accountability. Japan seemed to have all the ingredients
for success in the PC era, from strong manufacturing skills and control of many key
components technologies to a corporate structure that could support a sustained drive
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Yet in spite of Japan’s success in components and peripherals, the Japanese
computer makers have had only limited success in PCs, and have been virtually shut
out of the software industry.  The reasons for this mixed record are complex, yet the
most important have to do with Japan’s institutional and political structure or“rules of
the game”.
Part I.  The Theoretical Basis for Analysis
1.1  Flexible Production Strategy and Other Arguments
Some researchers such as Piore and Sabel (1984 pp.1-33) and Friedman (1988 pp.16-
45) provide an excellent study on the Japanese machine tool industry in applying their
theoretical arguments.  According to Friedman, both the statist and anti-statist (mostly
neo-classical) explanations cannot explain the Japanese economic growth properly.
Instead Friedman focuses on the flexible production strategy that has been adopted by
Japanese machine tool manufacturers and the effects of politics on specific industrial
outcomes.  Politics is viewed as“the fundamental orientation people possess about
justice, appropriate behavior, and rights throughout society”(Friedman 1988 p.17).
Politics is an important concern in the study of industrial outcomes because it shapes
the whole industrial order including the market.  Thus the Japanese market is not the
same as that of the United States. In order to understand the Japanese market
properly, one has to consider the historical and political contexts through which the
market is shaped.  The substantial role of small and medium sized enterprises whose
estimated market share was about 70 per cent of the Japanese machine tool production,
and the flexible production strategy adopted by them are cited as good evidence for
MITI’s inability to control the machine tools industry. By and large flexible production
strategy and politics in the machine tools industry, rather than the invisible hand of the
market or the visible hand of the state (MITI), are responsible for the success of the
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Japanese machinery industry, argues Friedman.
Global Division of Labor and Production Network Arguments
Another revisionist argument about the sources of East Asian development can be
called the“global division of labor and production network arguments,”which
emphasizes the ways that East Asian late developers are incorporated into the regional
and global division of labor.  The advocates of this view pay special attention to the fact
that technologies and industries at the mature stage usually transferred from the
advanced industrial countries to late developers in the forms of foreign direct
investments, off-shore manufacturing, and original equipment manufacturing
production. To the governments of East Asian countries, this was viewed as a good
opportunity to develop themselves, and thereby they tried to induce as much foreign
investment as possible. Local capitalists and MNCs interact with each other in order to
utilize this opportunity, and with the economic bureaucrats of the host countries, and
domestic and international financial institutions. By doing so, East Asian countries were
incorporated into the international division of labor and became a part of the
international economic structure. The complex interplay among governments, local
capitalists, and MNCs under the differing international political economic conditions and
structures is analyzed as to how it affects the relative economic performance among
different countries.
The“flying geese model”argued by Akamutsu (1962 pp.3-25) can be viewed as a
classic example in this view. Cumings’(1984 pp.12-56) well-known article about product
life cycle and geopolitics is also a typical example, which argues the ways that product
life cycle and geopolitical advantages are utilized by East Asian countries in achieving
economic development. Similarly, Henderson (1989 pp.1-66) points out the importance of
state intervention in the market at a time when foreign investments are coming into
the developing countries. Though Bernard and Ravenhill (1995 pp.171-197) criticize the
flying geese model of Akamutsu (1962 pp.3-25) and the product life cycle argument
addressed by Cumings (1984 pp.12-56), they also pay much attention to the existence of
regional production network centered on Japan in explaining the development of the
electronics industry in East Asia. Likewise, Gereffi (1994 pp.1-22, 1996 pp.75-112)
emphasizes the impacts of global commodity chains upon East Asian economic success.
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1.2  Towards Understanding CIA
The state seldom remains as developmental, anti-statist, or corporatist in the
policymaking and implementation process over time, not only because of the dynamic
state-society relations but also because of the bureaucratic politics within the state that
greatly affects the actions of the state which exercises some transformative power over
the“rules of the game”operating within the society.  The institutions of the industrial
structure, the strategies adopted by major producers, and the people involved in
sectoral politics are not necessarily the same through time (see for example, Friedman
1988 pp.1-134) so that the state in one sector may play radically different roles in other
sectors (see for example, Krasner 1978 pp.34-127).  To make things more complex,
changes in international political economy may provoke a radical shift in the role of the
state in industrial adjustment (Haggard and Kaufman 1992 pp.1-22), especially in the
economies that are heavily dependent upon international trade such as Taiwan and
Japan. But the adjustment strategies are not necessarily the same due in part to the
different domestic political economic structures represented as the rules of the game.
(see for example, Stallings 1992 pp.41-86 and Kahler 1992 pp.89-138). Just like the liberal
economic regime during the 1950s and 1960s provided good chances to East Asian late
developers, the neo-protectionist tendency of the advanced industrial countries after the
1970s has imposed significant constraints upon the same group of countries.
The existing literature on East Asian development provides unique sets of
explanations about the role of the state in the process of development and the ways
that industrial policies are shaped. They argue that industrial policies are the direct
outcomes of the structures and actions of the state (the statist approach), of free market
competition and utility maximization among interest groups and/or various market
factors (the anti-statist approach), of concentration of interests between the state and
capitalists without the participation of labor unions (developmental corporatism), of
embedded autonomy of the state-society relations (embedded autonomy argument), of
distinctive sectoral politics and production strategies as in Friedman (1988 pp.1-98), or of
global division of labor and production networks.
According to Evans, Stephens, and 青木 etc. a new comparative institutional
approach to political economy has emerged since the 1960s as a Lakatosian and Von
Neumannian research program in the course of theoretical conflicts between major
paradigms in the study of development, including modernization theory, dependency
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and world-system approaches, as well as the works of neo-Marxists and Third World
scholars. They say:
According to this new comparative institutional approach to political economy, the state
is“an organization which, since it cannot be otherwise than a social network of people,
exists in its own right and possesses interests of its own”(Cardoso 1979, 51). 
1.3  The Role of State Institutions and“the Rules of the Game”.
The role of the state apparatus in development“must be considered along with the
interaction of social classes if the politics of development is to be explained”(Evans and
Stephens 1988b p.723). Domestic class structure and industrial structure, as well as the
ways that interests are represented in a given society are the outcomes of historically
contingent interactions between the state and society. The degree of state intervention
is not constant but variant through time and space. As to the effects of international
contexts upon domestic development, the new comparative political economy
emphasizes:
In short, a new comparative political economy views the state and state-society
relations as historically and structurally variant, and thus the international system as
well as geopolitics have an impact upon the rules of the game and policy-making
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Its practitioners constitute a community of scholars who share important heuristic assumptions
... They attack a variety of substantive issues and are eclectic in their methodology but share a
number of characteristics that in combination serve to distinguish them from earlier work ...the
contemporary work on which we focus begins with the conviction that economic and political
development cannot fruitfully be examined in isolation from each other. It has absorbed the
lessons that grew out of work on dependency and world-system perspectives and is therefore
much more sensitive to international factors than classic political economy, but it has rejected
the idea that external factors determine the dynamics of domestic development. More
generally, it rejects models that posit“necessary”outcomes, assuming instead that
developmental paths are historically contingent. Multiple cases are preferred and when single
cases are used they are set in a comparative framework. Quantitative and other cross-sectional
data are located in the context of more historical evidence. (Evans and Stephens 1988b pp.713-
4; italics added)
Instead of seeing the international system as determining the possibilities for national
development the new comparative political economy takes a more recursive view in which the
world political economy both shapes and is shaped by the historical trajectories of
development within individual nation states. Further complexity is introduced by bringing
geopolitics back into the traditionally economic analysis of core-periphery relations. (Evans and
Stephens 1988b p.725)
process.  Thus the state in this view cannot be reduced to an aggregation of individuals
who possess certain positions within the bureaucracy at a particular time, and the
policy outcomes cannot be reduced to the results of individual utility maximization
regardless of time and space. Evans points out this very clearly:
Let us take some examples to see how the works on East Asian development could be
viewed as the application of a new comparative political economy deal with the state
and state-society relations in the process of development as well as in the industrial
policy-making process. Chu (1987 pp.188-255) in his study on different adjustment
strategies taken by the East Asian NICs during the 1970s and early 1980s, argues:
As shown above, it is clear that the role of the state can vary according to the
structural constraints, both domestic and international, imposed upon the state and
state-society relations. 
Though Samuels (1987 pp.234-279) views reciprocal consent as a major state-
business relation in Japanese energy politics, he does not have a theory of the state
different from that of other studies that could be viewed as the application of the new
comparative political economy. He argues that“state intervention would be enhanced
by six factors: market structure, centralization, developmental timing and finance,
openness to diversity, the nature of the ruling coalition, and administrative tradition”
(Samuels 1987 p.265). He further argues:
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In the comparative institutional approach, the state is seen as a historically rooted institution,
not simply a collection of strategic individuals.  The interaction of state and society is
constrained by institutionalized sets of relations. Economic outcomes are the products of social
and political institutions, not just responses to prevailing market conditions.  Understanding
diverse outcomes is the aim, not forcing cases into a generic mold or onto a one-dimensional
scale. (Evans 1995 p.18)
First, domestic structural arrangement can be an important source of national economic
strategies even for countries that are constrained by limited domestic markets and highly
dependent on external trade. Secondly, in state-dominated societies, the locus of domestic
policy determinants lies in the public realm. In accounting for state policy responses at
moments of international crises and changes, we should turn attention to the strategic
behaviors of the government elite positioned in a distinctive state structure, with different
policy tools and institutional resources at their disposal. (Chu 1987 p.245)
“understanding the Japanese policy process requires a prior appreciation of political conflict
within and across subgovemments rather than direct confrontation between unified actors.
Some have termed that process“reciprocal consent,”a formulation not completely
inconsistent with Japan, Inc. To the extent that it can accommodate diversity and conflict, and
From this quote, it is clear that the Japanese state has been corporative with
businesses in conducting industrial policies for the energy sector, not because of the
constant state-business relations as such but because of the structural conditions in
which the state, state institutions, and the business have been located. The same is also
true in Okimoto (1989 pp.219-238) who argues:
Likewise, Gereffi (1994 pp.1-16) argues that the key of East Asian industrial success is
neither the state nor the market. Rather it is the combination of organizational learning,
openness to diversity and institutional responses by local firms and states to the ever-
changing global commodity chains. Multi-layered production and marketing networks
that have been provided by the manufacturers and retailers in the advanced industrial
countries are major chances which allows East Asian NICs successful entry into the
proper positions in global commodity chains.
In contrast to the“old”studies that tend to freeze in time the state and state-
society relations in the process of East Asian development, the studies that are
categorized as the application of a new comparative political economy rely on the same
or similar theory of the state, which can be broadly defined as the capitalist theory of
the state. That is, the state is an organization that exists in its own right and possesses
interests of its own.  What matters to the researcher who wants to explain the role of
the state and other actors in the policy-making process are the structural conditions or
so called“rules of the game”that limit or encourage the state and other actors in
society to experiment with the diversity of trying different roles in the developmental
process. Those structural conditions may include the distribution of power between
classes, the degree of state autonomy and capacity, the degree of centralization of
employers’associations and labor organizations, industrial structure, openness to
diversity and experimentation, import/export controls, the alliances between the local
entrepreneurs and MNCs, the relative position of a country in the international political
economic system, and the geopolitical advantages and disadvantages that go along with
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to the extent that it can be disaggregated, Japan, Inc., may yet be the most elegant
characterization of the Japanese political economy.”(Samuels 1987 p.288)
Industrial policies for steel, lasers, and ICs pose a sharp contrast to those for agriculture, food
processing, and construction. The differences can be attributed largely to variations in the
patterns of interest aggregation involving the LDP, producer groups, and bureaucratic
agencies. (Okimoto 1989 p.229)
that position.
1.4  Foundations of Comparative Institutional Analysis
The institutional approach is not a totally new analytic framework.  The effects of
institutions upon state actions have been a major analytic focus of neo-Marxist scholars.
It has been advocated by many neo-Marxists that the structural arrangements or rules
of the game in the capitalist economy help to perpetuate the dominance of the capitalist
class by structuring the behavior of state managers (Miliband 1969 pp.78-145;
Poulantzas 1969 pp.78-179, 1978 pp.95-145; Offe 1974 pp.31-57, 1984 pp.34-99; Jessop 1977
pp.353-373, 1982 pp.112-179). Recently some studies on East Asian development begin to
pay much attention to institutions in examining national differences.  For instance, in
his study of the developmental process of the East Asian NICs, Haggard argues,
Understanding institutional differences, therefore, is crucial to explaining the cross
national differences in policy outcomes.  While the institutional approach has distinctive
merits in explaining historical, sectoral, and cross-national variations in policy outcomes,
it is also subject to drawbacks.  One possible criticism is that the institutional approach
is nothing more than a synthesis or summing up of what various existing approaches
say.  This is in a sense valid because institutions include not only state structures but
also norms and standard operating procedures in which various societal actors interact
with each other. Institutions also include international contexts that delimit the
interactions between players.  In this sense, the institutional approach certainly loses
theoretical conciseness.  However considering the utility of the institutional approach,
that is, its explanatory power in dealing with historical, sectoral as well as cross-national
and temporal dynamics, the sophistication of institutional analysis may not be a serious
theoretical weakness. Moreover when we analyze the cross-national variation in policy
outcomes of IT hardware policies in this particular study, we in fact examine only the
relevant differences rather than all institutions, which can relieve the complexity
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Their [state elites] freedom of maneuver depends, however, on institutional setting and the
organizational resources they have at their disposal.  Three dimensions of the state as an
institutional and legal structure bear on the ability of political elites to realize their interests.
The first is degree of insulation from societal pressures, which in turn is a function of the
institutional arrangements linking state and society.  The second is cohesiveness of the
decision-making structure itself. The third is instruments that are available to state elites in
pursuing their political and substantive goals. Variations in these institutional characteristics
influence policy choice and implementation. (Haggard 1990 pp.43-4)
problem to a certain extent.
Professor Aoki Masahiko has explained how the effective management of Japanese
firm organization that endogenizes contextual skill formation has been supported by
the complementarity of the contingent governance structure and the imperfect labor
market.  He argues that the contingent governance structure in turn has been
supported by regulations restricting entry to many industries that have made it
possible for these industries, such as main banks, to accrue rents.  In Aoki’s words:
However, Aoki claims that if quasi-rents move toward extinction for the various
reasons given above, the framework of bureau pluralism itself will be difficult to
maintain.  At that point he says that if comparatively disadvantaged industries seek
continued protection, the advanced firms would either lose their competitiveness due to
higher subsidization to disadvantageous sectors and interest groups, or would be under
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The regulation of entry into an industry and the protection of weak firms in disadvantaged
industries has been one of the primary institutional elements sustaining the Japanese economy.
By committing to the protection of the human capital value of the specific skills formed in each
industry, they have provided economic agents with incentives to invest in contextual skills..  In
Japan, most working people in all fields have been expecting the value of their human capital
to be maintained through a multilayered structure comprising their employing firm, the
industrial associations in their industry, and the ministry that oversees that industry. In my
book published in 1988, this system was referred to as“bureau pluralism.  The term“bureau”
originally referred to a“drawer”and implied sorting or arranging something.  The
bureaucracy has played an important role as agent and arbitrator in protecting the vested
interests of pluralistic groups in different fields.  However,“bureau pluralism”is not an“open
pluralism”as vested interests protected by bureaucratic administrative mediations merely
coexist and various organizational modes cannot be freely created.  This joint gain by all
parties was made possible by the existence of quasi-rents acquired from the international
market by upgrading the machine manufacturing industry, which accounts for 80 percent of
exports. It was maintained by distributing the quasi-rents attained by the internationally
advanced sectors to the underdeveloped sectors through such mechanisms as domestic price
distortion, taxes and subsidies, and entrance regulations.
If the learning or transplantation of these organizational innovations is combined with low
cost factors of production overseas, the potential for the Japanese economy to acquire quasi-
rents will rapidly decline. This trend will be further accelerated by organizational innovations
or the emergence of new industries in other countries. In a previous work I referred to the
following phenomenon as the“fundamental dilemma of bureau pluralism”: advanced sectors
that do not need bureaucratic protection tend to drift away from the bureau pluralistic
framework, while less developed sectors tend to rely on it more.’As long as the acquisition of
quasi-rents from the international market by the former is possible, the size of the pie that can
be distributed among interest groups will expand, so that the maintenance of bureau pluralism
will not be especially problematic. It may even contribute to social stabilization. (Aoki 2000
pp.129-131)
great pressure to move their manufacturing bases overseas to survive.  The resulting
dilemma would be that the only remaining employment opportunities would be in
comparatively disadvantaged industries.
Aoki argues that, from the perspective of information processing, there is potential
for the economy to continue to demonstrate efficiency in industries that can be
characterized as high engineering industries. He also points out that a fairly high
possibility that new innovations will be implemented domestically in cross-industrial
technologies, such as formation technology driven electronic machinery, retail and
service sector networking, and environmental management technologies.  However, the
dilemma of bureau pluralism might grow more serious, threatening the loss of
international competitiveness of the leading industries according to his argument. How
should this be handled?  Aoki says:
Establishing a new organizational mode different from the prevailing convention is not
so simple regardless of whether it is a creative innovation or a transplant from outside.
The skill types needed to sustain a new organizational mode may not be readily
available in the economy, and the institutional structure supporting the existing
organizational mode may not be conducive to experimentation with mutant modes.
Aoki says this places an exceptionally heavy burden on the Japanese economy, where
bureau pluralism has been implemented, because tall barriers have been constructed to
obstruct new entrants. By contrast, economies that have a regulatory stance is to allow
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The combined effect of such factors as the bounded rationality of individuals, evolutionary
pressures, and institutional complementarity is a tendency for a more or less homogeneous
organizational convention to be adopted throughout a particular economy.  However, different
organizational conventions will evolve in different nations. This is an unintended outcome of
the workings of bounded rationality. This chapter has made it clear that the potential gains
from organizational diversity cannot be fully realized on a global scale merely through free
trade.  This is a proposition that stands even if we assume a purely theoretical situation in
which all resources can be traded and there are no costs involved in transportation, storage,
etc. If we acknowledge the existence of resources or services that cannot be traded, the
proposition gains even more credence.
In Ricardian classical trade theory, the primary source of comparative advantage within
an economy is the relative quantities of the“primary factors of production”- land, labor, and
capital - which cannot themselves be moved between countries. The world can enjoy the gains
of trade by first converting these factors of production into outputs that can be traded. What
has been emphasized here, however, is that a world comprised of boundedly rational
individuals can reap economic gains because of the diversity of“organizational modes,”a
human construct. Theoretically, these could have been constructed by human intent anywhere,
at any time. (Aoki 2000 pp.131-32)
free entry into industries, such as under the Anglo-American system, have institutional
structures that are more tolerant of experimentation with mutant organizational modes.  
Part II.  Political Intervention: Leadership, Politics and IT Policy in Japan
2.1  Intervention Japanese Style
This part considers the reasons for Japan’s successes and failures in the PC era but
leave some troubling questions. For instance, why were Japanese companies slow to
recognize the importance of the PC, remaining fixated instead on the mainframe
industry and IBM during the period of 1985-92?  Why did MITI fail to stimulate a new
wave of start-up companies to compete in the wide-open early days of the PC industry?
Why has Japan been almost uniformly unable to develop an independent software
industry even though MITI and many consortiums poured a lot of money into their
software strategy? And why did most Japanese companies concentrate on the small
Japanese PC market and make only halfhearted attempts to penetrate foreign markets?
The answers to these questions are complex, and they go to the heart of Japan’s
industry structure’s rules of the game and corporate culture lack of diversity strategy.
The size, diversification, and vertical integration of Japan’s computer makers are
advantages in producing high-volume hardware products with stable technologies and
long product cycles, but they are a liability in the PC industry, with its unpredictable
market and technology shifts.  Also, the hardware orientation of Japan’s electronics
industry has meant that software is not given the prominence it deserves, given its
critical role in establishing technology standards. Finally, Japan’s educational system
has been very good at turning out a skilled manufacturing workforce, but it tends to
stifle the kind of creativity and initiative that is needed in the innovation-driven
segments of the industry as well as the white-collar sector.
A final question: Why did the bureaucrats who had guided Japan’s mainframe
industry fail to come up with a successful strategy to help Japan compete in the PC
era? This question becomes even more cogent when we look at the highly effective
government policies employed in Singapore and Taiwan that helped those countries
become important centers of PC production. To consider these issues in more detail, we
look first at Japan’s industry structure and business strategies, and then review the
industrial policies employed by the Japanese government during the PC era.
Evaluating Japan’s Decline in the PC Industry: An Institutional Approach
―　　―93
―　　―94
Industry Structure
Japan’s industry structure and corporate culture made it difficult for Japanese
companies to recognize and respond to the PC revolution. While constant churning of
people and companies marks Silicon Valley, Japan is marked by stability. The same
companies that created Japan’s computer industry in the 1960s still dominate in the 1990s.
Stability might be desirable in a mature industry such as automobiles or even mainframe
computers, but in a dynamic environment like the PC industry, it can be synonymous with
stagnation.  It is not simply the size of Japan’s computer giants that makes it difficult for
them to compete in PCs, but their tendency toward vertical integration and bureaucratic
decision-making. Worse yet is their ability to lock newcomers out of the domestic market,
preventing the emergence of a new wave of entrepreneurial PC-oriented companies like
those in the United States,  Taiwan, and elsewhere.
2.2  Japan and the PC Revolution
The personal computer revolution appeared to offer a tremendous opportunity for
Japan.  Combining their strengths in electronic components with their growing
capabilities in computer technology, the Japanese computer makers appeared likely to
become major competitors in the global PC industry. In fact, some in the United States
expected that Japanese companies would eventually use their control over upstream
components and technologies to dominate the industry. Former U.S. Trade
Representative Clyde Prestowitz, predicted that the Japanese would run away with the
world computer market.  Intel’s Andrew Grove predicted that Japan would overtake
the United States as the dominant world supplier of computer systems by 1992.  What
few suspected was that the PC revolution would so change the nature of the computer
industry that many of the presumed strengths of the Japanese companies would turn
out to be liabilities in the PC industry.
Japanese companies did succeed in controlling the market for many PC components
and peripherals, including DRAMs, flat-panel displays, and floppy disk drives, as well as
many key subcomponents and materials. But for the most part they failed to build on
those strengths to compete in the PC systems market. They were also unable to use
their strength in DRAMs and other semiconductors as a base for challenging Intel’s
dominance in microprocessors and were locked almost entirely out of the PC software
market. While Japan’s computer hardware production grew rapidly, its companies were
largely relegated to the decreasing returns segments of the industry.
Japanese companies are still world leaders in many components and peripherals,
but aggressive competitors elsewhere in Asia have challenged their leadership. In 1996,
a decade after driving Intel and other U.S. companies out of the DRAM business, Japan
was passed by Korea as the leading producer of DRAMs. Korea’s electronics companies
were also gearing up for a challenge in flat-panel displays, another Japanese stronghold.
Meanwhile, Taiwan had become so adept at producing PCs and components that
Japan’s computer makers were outsourcing production to Taiwanese OEMs to cut
costs and get products to market more quickly.  Japan’s problems were reflected in a
steep decline in computer production in the early 1990s, reversing a decade of rapid
growth.  Total output declined by 20% from 1991 to 1993, before rebounding slowly
from 1994 to 1996.  Most dramatic was the decline in mainframe production, as the shift
from mainframes to PCs finally hit the Japanese market.  Much of the short-term
decline in production can be attributed to the stagnation of the Japanese economy in
the aftermath of the“bubble”economy of the late 1980s.  Economic growth hovered
around 1 % per year from 1992 to 1995, and the Japanese computer industry, heavily
dependent on the domestic market, was especially hard hit. The domestic downturn
also forced Japanese components manufacturers to reduce investment just as they
were facing increased competition from U.S. and Asian competitors.
While mainframe and minicomputer companies around the world were victims of
the PC revolution, in the United States their decline was compensated for by the rapid
ascent of new PC-oriented companies such as Apple, Compaq, Dell, Microsoft, Novell,
and Lotus. The problem for Japan was that its decline in computers was systemic.  The
handful of large companies that control most of Japan’s computer industry all faced
serious downturns in the 1990s, and there were few newcomers to take up the slack.
And while IBM was able to reverse its fortunes through a painful restructuring and by
shifting focus to emphasize its service and network businesses, the Japanese giants
were hamstrung in their efforts to shift course by practices such as lifetime
employment and seniority-based promotion.  These practices-along with Japan’s
egalitarian educational system and emphasis on incremental improvement-were well
suited to stable, decreasing returns manufacturing businesses, but they were liabilities
in the unpredictable, rapidly changing increasing returns world of the PC industry.
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2.3  History of Japan’s PC Industry
Japan’s PC industry developed in parallel with the global industry, but for well over
a decade did not converge with it.  The first 8-bit Japanese PCs were introduced in the
mid-1970s soon after the first Altairs, Apples, and Commodores, and as in the United
States, a variety of incompatible architectures competed in the market. But in the 1980s,
while the United States and the rest of the world were standardizing on the IBM-PC
architecture, with corresponding growth and competition in all segments of the industry,
Japan remained a backwater of incompatible standards, high prices, and slow growth.
The fragmentation of the domestic market was due in part to the complexity of the
Japanese written language.  Japanese PCs had to be able to input, store, display, and
print around 6,000 kanji characters, compared to about 200 for European languages.
This meant that IBM PC-compatible computers lacked the power to handle the
complex Japanese language without special hardware until the 80486 generation of
microprocessors became available in the late 1980s. 
Table 2.1  Computer Hardware Manufacturing Market Share: Japan, Taiwan,
Korea 1995 and 2000 Compared.  % of World Market.
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Region
Korea
Taiwan
Japan
% Share 
(in units)
Desk PC
95……2000
05……09%
10……17%
06……05%
% Share of
products.
Notebook
PC
95……2000
01……03%
28……51%
37……27%
Global
Monitors 
& LCDs
95……2000
19……31%
30……33%
40……34%
Production
(in units)
Mother
Boards
95……2000
00……02%
68……78%
05……05%
for various
Hard Disk
95……2000
03……06%
n.a.
30……27%
($ Value)
%
ICs&
related
95……2000
07……05%
04……14%
31……20%
($ Value)
%
SRAM &
Flash
95……2000
30……36%
02……11%
38……29%
Sources: (Institute for Information Industries (MIC/III), Asia IT Report (February 1996 and November
1996); Electronics Industries Association of Korea (EIAK), 1995 Statistics of Electronic Industries
(Seoul: EIAK, 1996 pp.34-87); ITRI Statistics 1995 & 2000 pp.65-98; 工業技術研究院 2001 pp.78-113.
(compiled by author) * Large companies and government agencies include merchant sales only. Does
not include captive production by PC vendors.
The high cost of PCs kept demand low, and Japan’s PC penetration level remained
about one-third that of the United States well into the 1990s.  The demand for PCs was
also limited by the difficulty of using DOS-based Japanese PCs. Typing kanji characters
on a keyboard requires multiple keystrokes and choices among different characters to
represent the correct meaning among homonyms (which are very common in the
Japanese spoken language). Rather than buy PCs, many users opted for specialized
word processing machines designed to handle Japanese text more easily. Several
developments changed the face of the Japanese PC market in the 1990s, however. One
was the availability of more powerful microprocessors capable of doing higher-level
tasks that previously were handled by mainframes, such as financial analysis and
database management. These processors were also able to handle Japanese characters
directly in the operating system more easily, making possible three major
developments in the Japanese software market.
Under the combined assault of Apple and U.S. vendors selling DOS/V machines,
NEC’s market share began to erode, from 52% in 1991 to 43% in 1994 (table 3-2).
Fujitsu, Toshiba, and Seiko Epson also lost ground, while U.S. companies grabbed a 30%
market share. The Japanese market had been cracked open by the efforts of IBM,
Compaq, Apple, and Microsoft, which had done in computers what U.S. trade
negotiators had struggled to accomplish in other sectors. However, the Japanese
companies were not ready to capitulate in their home market, and in 1995 Fujitsu
launched its own price war, leaving both NEC and the U.S. vendors reeling.
Compared to the tremor in the market caused by“Compaq shock,”“Fujitsu shock”
was a major earthquake. Fujitsu cut prices so low that many analysts claimed the
company was losing hundreds of dollars on each PC it sold (a claim refuted by Fujitsu,
which argued that those estimates included initial investments in marketing,
distribution, and product development). And while limited distribution channels and
lack of brand name recognition hindered Compaq, Fujitsu was able to mobilize its vast
Japanese distribution system to challenge NEC. Fujitsu introduced a rash of new low-
cost models, many of which were sourced from Taiwan to cut costs and quickly ramp
up volume.  The result was a leap in market share from just 9% in 1994 to 18% in 1995
and 22% in 1996. Some of Fujitsu’s gains came at the expense of Apple, whose more
general corporate problems were spilling over into Japan, but most of the gains came at
the expense of NEC, whose market share dropped to 33% in 1996. By 1996, NEC
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announced that it would begin selling DOS/V machines in Japan via its Packard
Bell/NEC subsidiary, in effect acknowledging that the PC-98’s days were numbered.
The other impact of Fujitsu shock was a boom in PC sales. Interest in PCs was spurred
by a multimedia fad in 1994 and Internet fever in 1995, and as prices fell, demand
soared. Japan’s PC market grew from 3.2 million units in 1994 to more than 8 million
units in 1996, as Japanese businesses finally embraced the PC.
Table 2.2  Revenues and Profits of IBM and Japanese Computer Makers 
(In US$ Millions )
Sources: McKinsey & Company, The 1993 Report on the Computer Industry; The 1994
Report on the Computer Industry; and The 1996 Report on the Computer Industry
(New York: McKinsey & Company, 1993, 1994, and 1996); Datamation, The Datamation
100 (June 15, 1996, and June 15, 1993); Electronic Business Asia (various issues 1994-
1997) (compiled by author).
‘Separate computer industry net income data not available for NEC and Hitachi
U.S. companies, who unified the Japanese software market and introduced price
competition, yet the consequences for those companies have been mixed, largely
instigated the revolution in Japan’s PC market. Microsoft has been the biggest winner,
enjoying rapid growth in demand for its operating systems and applications, while Intel
has likewise benefited from growth in demand for its microprocessors. For IBM and
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1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
IBM Revenues 65,958 60,479 59,657 57,778 62,065 69,473
Profits 5,719 -2,827 -6,870 -7,506 2,784 3,975
NEC Revenues-computer 10,145 13,033 13,234 14,452 15,700 18,365
Profits-corporate’ 580 370 120 -375 70 700
Fujitsu Revenues-computer 17,890 17,839 20,047 20,738 23,514 28,283
Profits-computer 440 338 21 -92 -583 911
Amdahl Revenues 2,159 1,703 2,525 1,681 1,639 1,516
Profits 184 11 -1 -35 75 29
Hitachi Revenues-computer 1,166 10,290 11,352 11,700 14,673 15,672
Profits-corporate’ 1,703 1,091 666 634 1,280 1,337
Compaq the results have been more ambiguous. Neither was able to make major
inroads into the Japanese PC market, and their growth in sales volume was balanced
by shrinking profit margins caused by Fujitsu’s price war. More ominously, the
challenge in their domestic market has led Japan’s PC makers finally to become serious
about competing in the global market where Compaq and IBM are the leaders.
Besides the role of U.S. companies in shaking up Japan’s PC industry, the biggest
story in recent years was Fujitsu Shock. Why did this stodgy mainframe vendor
suddenly leap into the PC era with such an atypical strategy for a Japanese company?
The most plausible answer, and one that is supported by discussions with a few Fujitsu
managers, points to the decline in the mainframe business, which accounted for about
40% of Fujitsu’s revenues in 1992.  Having gone into the red, and seeing its subsidiaries
Amdahl and ICL in similar trouble, Fujitsu responded with an all-out price war to buy
market share in the PC industry. The company felt that it could only compete by
increasing its sales volume and gaining the economies of scale enjoyed by IBM,
Compaq, and others. For the longer term, it targeted the export market, but initially it
could get the biggest impact in the domestic market, where it could deploy existing
production and distribution channels to rapidly increase its sales volume. By 1996, PC
prices had begun to stabilize and Fujitsu had established itself as the major competitor
to NEC in the Japanese market.
2.4  Global Competitiveness
Rather than use their insulated home market as a profit sanctuary from which to
invade foreign markets, Japan’s leading computer makers --Fujitsu, Hitachi, and NEC--
spent the first decade of the PC revolution fighting over the Japanese market. The only
exception was Toshiba, which successfully targeted the global market with its line of
portable PCs. However, Japan’s PC makers might yet make their presence felt in the
United States and other markets in the 21st Century. Having driven the foreigners
back from the ramparts of their domestic market, the Japanese vendors ventured into
the U.S. market in 1997. Fujitsu and Hitachi established product development and
assembly facilities in California to design and produce notebook PCs for the U.S.
market. Consumer electronics leader Sony introduced multimedia PCs made by Intel
for the U.S. market, hoping to position itself for the convergence of computers and
consumer electronics. Toshiba began to move beyond its niche in notebook PCs by
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introducing a multimedia desktop PC for consumers in the United States in 1996 and
followed with a line of desktops and servers for the business market in 1997.  NEC
went a step further and purchased a controlling interest in the U.S. PC maker Packard-
Bell, which had used low-priced machines to take first place in the U.S. consumer
market but had nearly gone bankrupt doing so.  The Japanese vendors also abandoned
many of their domestic suppliers and began tapping the global production system to
cut production costs.  
Failures in Soft Wars
While the Japanese hardware industry has had mixed success in the PC era, the
software industry has been an almost unqualified failure. The software and information
services market is actually very large, totaling US$41.8 billion in 1995 210.6 billion in
2000.  However, packaged software accounted for only 23.6% of the Japanese software
and services market, with users still relying largely on custom programs.  In
comparison, packaged applications accounted for more than 37% of U.S. software and
services spending in 1995.14 The balance is now shifting in Japan as PCs become more
widely diffused in 2000 and 2001, but the slow adoption of packaged software was
detrimental to the Japanese software industry.
Packaged software can be commercialized and exported, while custom software is
written to the specifications of a particular user.  Producing packaged software is also
an effective use of programmers’time. While a custom program will be written once
and used by one customer, a packaged product will be written once and used by
thousands or even millions of users.  So far, Japan has been unable to develop an
internationally competitive software industry. In 1995, Japan ran a US$3.9 billion trade
deficit in computer software (excluding games).15  Japanese software makers are
unable to compete effectively even in their domestic market. More than 60% of the
packaged software sold in Japan is imported, mostly from the United States.16  This is
surprising because domestic producers should have an advantage in a local market,
especially one with a unique language. Yet foreign producers have been able to adapt
their programs to the Japanese language and market. Much of the PC software market
is dominated by Microsoft, which not only controls over 80% of the operating systems
market, but also has a majority of the office suite market with the Japanese version of
Microsoft Office. Oracle also has made large inroads into the Japanese market, gaining
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more than 40% of the corporate database market in competition with proprietary
products from Fujitsu and other Japanese vendors.
U.S. Standards Make Japan Dependant
The inability of Japanese companies to control any of the major architectures for
hardware or software has plagued the industry from the beginning. Mochio Umeda
argues that while Japanese companies know how to manufacture, they lag behind
American firms in knowing what to manufacture, allowing the United States to
maintain its control over key standards.  For instance, Japanese mainframe makers had
caught up with IBM in performance by the early 1980s but still depended on IBM
standards and were forced to make large royalty payments to IBM. Japanese
supercomputers had surpassed U.S. machines in some speed benchmarks by the late
1980s, but the large library of software available for Cray supercomputers allowed Cray
to maintain its lead in the commercial market. The pattern repeated itself in the PC
industry, where Japan’s development of incompatible PC architectures left it isolated
from international standards that were controlled by U.S. companies. Dependence on
U.S. standards has trapped the Japanese computer industry in the decreasing returns
segments of the PC industry.  While Japanese companies do hold near-monopoly
positions in some profitable upstream technologies, they have been unable to break into
the large increasing returns markets for software and microprocessors. Even NEC’s
proprietary PC-98 architecture was based on Intel chips and Microsoft’s operating
system. NEC was unable to protect its PC standard when IBM and Microsoft created
open standards for the Japanese market.
Japan’s dependence on Microsoft’s software standards is not surprising, given its
general weakness in software. Somewhat more surprising has been the failure of
Japan’s semiconductor industry to break Intel’s control of the microprocessor market.
Each of the major Japanese PC platforms was based on Intel processors, but there once
appeared to be a good possibility that the Japanese could eventually challenge Intel’s
leadership. For instance, while NEC used Intel chips in the PC-98, it also developed its
own version of the 80X86 chips, called the V-series. Intel sued NEC for patent
infringement, but in 1989 a U.S. court ruled against Intel, opening the door for NEC to
sell its V-series processors to any PC maker. At the time, many in the United States
predicted that the Japanese, no longer blocked by legal challenges from Intel, would
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overwhelm the U.S. microprocessor industry. Japan’s dominance of the DRAM industry
was expected to give the Japanese chipmakers a critical advantage in achieving higher
yields and lower production costs by applying process technologies developed for
DRAM production.  NEC was not the only likely challenger; Fujitsu, Hitachi, and
Toshiba all had experience as second source producers of earlier Intel or Motorola
processors and were licensing new RISC designs from U.S. companies. When they tried
to challenge Intel, however, Japan’s chipmakers came up against the power of
increasing returns in the form of Intel’s control of the x86 standard. NEC’s V-series
chips never caught on with PC makers, and by 1993 the company had stopped using
them even in its own computers.
The second category of explanations focuses on the dominance of the Japanese
economy by the giant keiretsu, who control access to capital and distribution channels.
This argument is supported by the example of NEC’s use of an extensive distribution
channel to dominate the PC market. However, this does not explain the absence of
export-oriented start-ups, since the keiretsu’s distribution channels did not influence
international markets. Why were small Taiwanese companies able to develop linkages
to the global production network, while small Japanese companies were left out? It is
not surprising that existing small companies remained tied to their parent companies’
domestic production chains, but why the lack of newcomers to test the international
waters? 
2.5  Industry Structure for Software
The entire Japanese computer industry has been hobbled by its weakness in
software, and the problem has been especially serious in the PC industry. While Japan’s
software industry is said to outperform its U.S. counterparts in some measures of
programmer productivity and quality control, it has grown more slowly and is less
innovative than the U.S. industry. Perhaps the most serious problem is that Japan has
failed to develop a vibrant independent software industry able to produce a broad
variety of commercial software packages for the PC.  There are few Japanese
equivalents to independent U.S. firms that dominate the global packaged software
industry-and which now control more than half of the Japanese packaged software
market. By contrast, most independent Japanese software firms are relatively small and
sell only to the domestic market.
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Some of Japan’s software problems are the result of the evolution of the industry.
Japan’s computer makers originally sold software and services in conjunction with
hardware sales, just as IBM had before it unbundled its software and hardware in 1969.
The Japanese government required unbundling in 1977, but the practice of treating
software as part of the hardware package remained common, hindering the growth of
an independent software industry. Instead, most software was developed either by the
hardware makers, their subsidiaries, or by users themselves. In each case, the focus
was on custom software, either to lock in customers to the vendor’s proprietary
hardware or to offer users a perceived competitive advantage in their own industry by
developing software tailored to their business processes.
The custom approach created problems for the Japanese software industry. Custom
programming is labor intensive and exacerbates the critical shortage of software
personnel. If a Japanese programmer can produce more lines of code per hour than an
American programmer, it would appear that the Japanese programmer is more
productive. But this calculation is deceiving. If the Japanese program has only one user,
while thousands use the American program, the American programmer has actually
been thousands of times as productive in terms of the value of his or her output. Also,
the claims that Japanese programmers deliver code with fewer errors is misleading,
since Japanese programmers are often making minor modifications on existing
programs, while American programmers are more likely to be developing new
products or major modifications of old programs.
The custom software approach led to a rigid division of labor coordinated by
hardware vendors and large users.  In the beginning, vendors would assign personnel
to the user site to develop custom programs and train the users’own information
systems departments.  Over time, both vendors and users began to spin-off their
application developers into subsidiaries that now dominate the software and systems
integration business in Japan. These include vendor spin-offs such as Fujitsu FIP,
Hitachi Information Systems, Toshiba Information Systems, and NEC Software, and
user spin-offs such as NTT Data Systems, Nomura Research Institute, and Nippon Steel
Information Systems. While hardware vendors keep operating system development in-
house, the vendor and user spin-offs coordinate and develop most applications,
contracting lower level activities to independent software houses, which subcontract
work to even smaller firms.  Software development is implemented through a top-down,
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centrally coordinated management system that bears a strong resemblance to Japan’s
manufacturing structure.  Japanese companies treat software production as a factory
operation, breaking development down into a linear progression of planning, design,
system engineering, and coding.  This process creates coordination problems and
discourages creativity throughout the system.
Another problem is that custom programming is focused on the mainframe and
minicomputer markets, and the skills required to develop and market custom programs
do not translate easily to the rapidly growing PC software market. Packaged software
requires a focus on creating products that are valuable to a large number of users,
which is contrary to the idea of developing customized solutions to a specific user’s
needs. The inability of older software companies to make the switch to the PC market
would not be a problem if new independent software houses were able to meet the
demand for packaged software.  But while many software vendors did spring up to
develop PC applications, their growth was stunted by barriers related to Japan’s
industry structure.  These include lack of access to capital and barriers to distribution
channels.
The shortage of venture capital is especially acute in the software industry. Japan’s
capital markets lack the knowledge and experience needed to evaluate software
makers, whose assets are intellectual and intangible, and whose future profitability is
difficult to predict. In the United States, there are venture capitalists that specialize in
software companies and have the experience to judge their prospects more accurately.
The Japanese venture capital market consists mostly of firms affiliated with banks and
securities firms, who tend to invest in more traditional industries. In 1989, only 0.04% of
total investment by venture capitalists in Japan went to the software industry,
compared to 11% in the United States.
There has been some effort by the government and banks to increase venture
capital investment in software. The government has offered grants and loans to
software companies with innovative products, although many argue that these are little
more than bailouts to small subcontractors who have been squeezed by the recession.
Also, software distributor Softbank has offered to help private banks screen software
companies for investment. Softbank is one of the few big entrepreneurial success
stories in the Japanese computer industry, but it remains to be seen if it has good
instincts in the venture capital market. The software industry also suffers from
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shortages and poor deployment of human resources.  Most computer science graduates
end up in large hardware firms. Software firms therefore are usually left hiring people
with no training in computer science, which they then must train as programmers.
The small independent companies at the bottom of the software production chain are
given such specialized tasks to perform that their staff is unlikely ever to gain the
breadth of experience needed to take on more complex tasks.  These companies find it
difficult to hire or develop the skilled people that they would need to move into
development of packaged programs.  The training and personnel management in
Japanese software companies tends to stifle creativity as well. New hires are all trained
in identical programs, regardless of their previous education or experience, and the
practice of seniority-based promotion does not reward a programmer’s productivity or
creativity.
Finally, software is simply not highly respected as a product in Japan.  The
tradition of bundling hardware and software caused both vendors and users to
undervalue software, since it was not paid for separately.  As a result, software
professionals do not receive the respect given to hardware specialists.  They generally
do not receive top salaries, nor are they likely to rise to top management positions in
major corporations.  This discourages bright students from studying for careers in
software.  Likewise, Japan’s highly regimented software industry has not produced any
equivalent to Microsoft, Adobe, Novell, or other successful software start-ups in the
United States. With few exceptions, the best-known companies and recognizable
individuals in Japan are on the hardware side. As one software professional put it,
“Software is not respected.  It is not a good job to have because software people cannot
be promoted to the top”Such factors have been obstacles to the development of Japan’s
software industry.  Most important, these factors have severely stunted the growth of
independent software companies producing packaged software.  The weakness of
Japanese packaged software is most vividly illustrated by the fact that over 60% of the
packaged software market consists of imported programs. Add to that the large
amount of pirated software in use, most of which is undoubtedly foreign in origin, and it
is clear that very little of the software running on Japanese PCs originated in Japan.
Software and information services are the fastest growing segments of the IT industry,
and will become even more important as national and global information infrastructures
are developed.
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The big beneficiaries of the shift to PCs and packaged software have been U.S.
companies. Microsoft dominates the market for PC applications and Oracle is now the
number one seller of database packages in Japan, competing against the proprietary
products from Fujitsu and Hitachi. Developers of packaged software for the PC98
platform now find their DOS-based applications obsolete and they must compete with
giants like Microsoft in the Windows market. And while the big U.S. vendors have the
resources to develop Japanese-language versions of their products, few Japanese firms
can develop and market products for international markets. 
2.6  Domestic Market: Slow Adoption of Information Technology
Japan is an advanced user of some technologies, such as on-line banking systems,
but it is far behind in implementing client-server computing, local area networks (about
one-fourth the U.S. level), and the Internet (one-tenth the U.S. level). Internet mania
finally arrived in 1995, but the high cost of telecommunications and access services
limited the diffusion of Internet use in Japan. The greatest benefits from PCs come
when they are connected together in a network, creating“network economies”that
can only be achieved when a significant number of computers are linked together.
Japan has been slow to realize these benefits.
The Japanese market has been conservative, lagging behind the United States in
shifting from mainframes to PCs and adopting the Internet. This is partly because
computer vendors did not encourage users to give up their expensive proprietary
mainframes for cheap PCs.  It is also due to the conservative nature of user
organizations. Big companies were accustomed to centralized computing systems, and
there was no ground swell from individuals or departments demanding PCs on their
desktops.  The PC was seen by users as a tool for secretaries, not managers, and
communications systems such as e-mail were seen as impersonal and difficult to use
with Japanese characters.
The conservative use of computers in Japan has limited the country’s ability to
achieve productivity gains by applying information technology.  The muted competition
in the PC market before 1992 also put the computer makers at a competitive
disadvantage internationally. Japanese PC companies were not able to use the domestic
market as a base for developing competitive products as they had in other industries,
such as consumer electronics and automobiles.  With the Japanese PC market
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fragmented among different standards and limited by high prices, no one could achieve
economies of scale. Nor could they export the products they sold in Japan, since they
were not built to international standards. Rather than an asset, the domestic market
became a distraction that kept the Japanese industry from focusing on the U.S. market,
where technology trends and standards were being set.  The protected, profitable
domestic market was big enough to support a few PC companies, reducing the
imperative to do battle in more competitive global markets. This contrasts with
Taiwanese companies such as Acer, which could not survive off the domestic market
and so were forced to think globally.
The costs of a backward domestic market were even greater for the software and
services industries.  Close interaction between producers and sophisticated users is
critical in the software development process.  For instance, the alpha and beta testing
of new software generations provides invaluable feedback to software developers on
the features desired by users and helps eliminate bugs before the program is
commercialized.  Sophisticated users also find new applications for programs that help
expand the market for a product. In the rapidly growing systems integration industry,
interaction between providers and users is vital to improving the knowledge and
capabilities of both parties.
The PC boom of the mid-1990s helped bring Japan closer to international levels of
computer use.  With PCs, networking, and Internet use became more widespread by
2000,  Japan finally came more into the mainstream of the global computer market.
This change may still help Japan reap productivity gains in industry and government
by 2004.  NEC giving up the PC98 system and the unification of much of the Japanese
PC industry around the Wintel standard made it more competitive internationally in
hardware, but the prospects for the software industry are less promising.
Human Resources
Japan has a large, high-quality pool of engineers to support its electronics and
semiconductor industries, with particular strength in process engineering. Japanese
universities granted 81,355 bachelor’s degrees in engineering in 1990, compared to
64,705 for the United States.  Japan only produced 1,370 doctoral degrees in
engineering, compared to 5,696 in the United States. Hardware skills such as electronics
engineering have long been in high demand by the big electronics firms, which offer
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good salaries, job security, and prestige.  This has lured top students into such fields,
and the flow of top students into such companies has reinforced their competitive edge.
On the other hand, Japan has a serious shortage of computer professionals. While
the number of software professionals as a share of total population in Japan is
comparable to the United States, there is a much lower level of university-trained
computer specialists. The number of graduates with bachelor’s degrees in math and
computer science was just 3,125 in 1990, compared to 42,369 in the United States and
this trend continued through the 90’s affecting the IT industry severely. It is estimated
that only 20% to 30% of the courses offered in Japanese computer science programs are
comparable to courses in the U.S. standard ACM curriculum. 83  The situation is worse
in advanced degrees.  Japan has never produced more than 88 doctoral degrees in
math and computer science in a single year, while the United States produced 2,024 in
1993 alone.  Japan has also sent far fewer students to the United States for graduate
degrees in science and engineering than have other Asian countries such as China,
Korea, and Taiwan.
Most of the small number of computer science graduates ends up working for
major hardware vendors or large software firms, leaving the rest of the industry to get
by with university graduates from other majors and graduates of vocational schools,
two-year colleges, technical schools, and high schools.  Also, many Japanese business
and media pundits seem unaware of the huge discrepancy between the quantity and
quality of graduate education when comparing Japan to the USA, Britain, or Taiwan.
User organizations likewise have a limited pool of professionals to draw upon.  Most
computer skills are developed through on-the-job training, and few companies provide
workers with systematic outside training in computer skills and Japan rarely issues H1
or V1 Visas to highly educated foreigners to fill these positions as is done frequently in
the USA, Britain and Taiwan when there is a demand.
The lack of job mobility between Japanese companies often makes it difficult for
companies to get experienced workers and limits the dissemination of skills throughout
the industry as well as making it virtually impossible to make quick transitions in
human resource strategy according to market conditions.  Also, the job status and
compensation offered by the larger companies can not be matched by small companies,
making it difficult for more dynamic small companies to get the skills they need to
succeed.  Strict limits on immigration into Japan shut off a supply of skilled foreign
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workers that has been very important to the U.S., Canada and Taiwan PC industries as
mentioned above.  The shortage and poor deployment of human resources is an
obstacle to Japan’s ability to compete in computer systems, develop an independent
software industry, and effectively apply computers throughout the economy efficiently.
Not only does Japan need more computer professionals, it also needs to increase the
computer literacy of its entire workforce, from top management to the shop floor.
2.7  Conclusion
Japan and other countries such as Taiwan and Singapore have taken largely
different paths for the same policy goals mainly due to the institutional differences
caused by different structures in business, state, and NGO sectors. These institutional
differences in a combined way affect the interactions between the core players in the
state and society and also affect the path dependency and options for their respective
organizational strategies. By showing the different organizational strategies that were
formulated and implemented by the states in Japan and other countries, and by
uncovering the causes of such variation, this research argues that the state and state-
society relations in the development of organizing institutions for all sectors
(institutional development in particular) vary through time, across societies, and across
industrial sectors according to indigenous circumstances.  Once economic
backwardness has been overcome to a certain extent, institutions in the state-business
and state-society relations that have been formulated throughout the developmental
process may vary across societies and across industrial sectors and also time. Different
institutions, in turn, affect the interactions among the people involved in the policy-
making process as well as in interest group representation in a given society, which
may result in different political and economic outcomes as shown above.
The combination of industry structures, domestic markets, and national capabilities
(especially human resources) explains why Japanese companies thrived as producers of
high-volume hardware and became competitive in the mainframe business, yet
struggled in PCs and software.  The closely integrated keiretsu industry structure
provided ready capital, reliable supply chains, and captive customers. The domestic
market also served as a proving ground for both consumer electronics and electronics
components that could be exported in high volumes. However, both producers and
users were slow to react to the PC revolution on a large scale and cost effective way.
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Vertical integration and lack of new ventures left Japan partly isolated from the
dynamic global production system for PC hardware.  Software factories were of no use
in creating packaged software. Entrepreneurial start-ups were starved for capital and
access to distribution channels because there was no venture capital market per se.
Also, engineers, programmers, and other professionals were trained to be average, and
they were lured into large organizations that offered prestige but discouraged
innovation. Only in the 1990s, faced with a slump in the entire electronics industry, did
Japanese companies begin to make changes in their corporate cultures and practices,
and these changes have been very slow at best.
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